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Governance and Tax Regime
Chirashree Das Gupta and Mohit Gupta
 
Introduction
1 This paper is an overview of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF)—a legal entity embedded
in tax, corporate governance and state codification of Hindu personal law in India. The
HUF found legal recognition in the late 19th century, but it was the Income Tax Act under
colonial rule in 1922 that gave it the status of a separate and distinct tax entity. The legal
category of the HUF has existed in the tax code since then. This inclusion is based on a
much longer history of recognition of customary law by the British colonial state in India.
In the interpretation of the colonial state, the HUF represented a joint family that was
held together by strong ties of kinship and entailed a variety of joint property relations
among the members. There were blurred and porous boundaries between the cultural
underpinnings of the family as a social entity and the commercial existence of the family
as  a  trading entity.  These  porous  boundaries  were  a  function  of  marriage,  lineage,
patriarchal ties, and trade and business. The colonial interpretation of the entity did not
recognize the complex networks which resulted in the family as a business entity being
governed by personal laws as against partnership firms being defined by legal contracts
(Birla 2008). This had its roots in the colonial legal system which set a clear dividing line
between the “public” and the “private.” Its “public” side aimed at rendering an individual
free of moral relations, and law was meant to shape the individual’s relations freely in the
market,  while its personal side entrenched the denominational status based on caste,
religion and family as basis for individual rights (Washbrook 1981).
2 This  dual  characteristic  of  the HUF shaped its  legal  status as  a  unit  of  business  and
taxation. It was recognized as a trading entity/ family firm i.e.  an income-generating
entity on the production side of the economy. But the arguments against it being taxed
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were based on recognizing cultural ties,  customary existence and the notion that the
family  preceded  the  firm,  and  that  “family  income”  was  solely  for  the  purpose  of
maintenance of the unit and fulfilling of customary obligations—i.e. the family was an
income-utilizing entity on the consumption side of the economy. This sharp exclusivity of
definition inherent in the neoclassical conception of economic activities—with a tight
compartmentalization of production and consumption—created for the state the dilemma
of deciding what the HUF was at the time the Income Tax Acts of 1860 and 1886 were
passed. Both the acts recognized the HUF as a variant of a legal person under the category
of “individuals” (Birla 2008). Finally in the debate on the Super Tax Bill of 1917, it was
proposed the HUF be recognized as a distinct category for taxation, in order to overcome
the problem of  the dual  characteristics of  being a family and a business entity.  This
interpretation led to the recognition of  the HUF as  a  separate tax entity  which was
subsequently incorporated into the Income tax Act of 1922 (Newbigin 2013). It is this dual
existence of the HUF as both a family and a firm that makes it distinctive from all other
institutional categories, as we shall see in the next two sections.
3 However,  it  was  in  the  first  decade  after  independence  that  the  HUF  was  legally
consecrated (as originating in state code through the codification of Hindu customary
and personal law) and then integrated into the Indian corporate governance and taxation
system. Thus the HUF’s consecration in state code is the major departure in its status
after independence as compared to the colonial period.
4 The historical literature on the evolution of institutions of Indian business in the colonial
era and the first three decades after independence has focused on the political economy
of colonialism, caste, community and the specificities of the mercantile character of the
“business-house”  structure,  thus  recognizing  the  business  house  (as  an  institution
consisting of interlocked corporate entities and not discrete firms and companies) as the
unit of organization of capital and business (Bagchi 1972; Markovits 1985; Tripathi 1990;
Tyabji 2000). In sharp contrast in the last two decades, the dominant literature on the
post-independence period is based on an envisioning of Indian business as a plethora of
independent firms whose relationships with one another are based on industrial cluster-
formation.  These firms are buyers and sellers  in and across industries  and disparate
entities,  which  have  economic  linkages  mediated  by  the  market  as  opposed  to
institutional linkages through organizational inter-locks (De Beule and Narayanan 2016).
In  India,  the  organization  of  the  “business  house”  was  legally  sanctioned  through
multiple pieces of legislations spanning corporate and tax laws and it forms the object of
studies in the literature on “corporate governance” (Sarkar and Sarkar 2012). But the
relationship between the discrete legal units recognized as private income- or wealth-
generating and accumulating entities (individuals, partnership firms, public and private
limited  companies,  trusts  and  societies  and  the  HUF)  are  not  the  subject  of  critical
examination. Both in law and the study of law, the unit of analysis assumes all units that
comprise a business group to be distinct, separate and mutually exclusive wealth-and
income-generating entities.
5 A third set of sociological literature (Singer 1968; Owens 1971) examined the family and
business  interface  from  a  socio-cultural  perspective,  but  did  not  examine  the  legal
embedding  of  the  family-firm/business-house  inter-locks.  This  lacuna  is  significant
because, just when this literature was being generated, the Hazari report in 1967 officially 
identified the “business group” consisting of inter-locking firms and companies as the
basic institutional unit of organization of Indian big capital.  This was opposed to the
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dominant macroeconomic construction that followed later of “firms” and “households/
family” as disparate and mutually exclusive units of analysis.  In Hazari’s analysis the
group consisted of a number of related and unrelated activities of a plethora of firms and
companies,  controlled  by  a  single  central  decision-making  authority  and  thereby
functioning as a coordinated organization. The report showed that besides a high degree
of product concentration, big capital in India was dominated by a few representative
units of capital organization (through interlocked firms) in most areas of industry and
trade in the form of the “business group” (Hazari 1967). The key groups of business, both
old and new, maintained both ownership and control over capital  flows and decision
making through the modalities of the institutional structure of the family run business
house (Das Gupta 2010, 2016). This was the understanding of the structure of monopoly
capital  in  India  as  opposed  to  monopoly  conceptualized  as  product  and  market
concentration  in  the  mainstream  economic  literature.  In  this  paper,  this
conceptualization of the monopoly of  family-run business houses,  in the institutional
organization of capital-accumulation structures and processes in India, follows from the
analysis of  monopoly structures and process in terms of ownership and control  over
capital flows and decision making in the entity of the family-run business house.
6 More recently, the study of the legal institution of the “family” has fallen in the ambit of
specialized readings of “personal laws” with respect to the relationship between religious
code and property rights (Agnes 1990, 2011; Parashar 1992). But it does not examine the
family/firm interface. While the entity of the “business group” has found its conceptual
space in institutional economics and the larger social science literature, the familial basis
of ownership and control of corporate structures remains a grossly understudied area.
The relationship between the two and the regimes of accumulation in independent India
has been largely unexplored in the otherwise growing corpus of business studies and
business-management literature on the relation between the family-owned business
group, “corporate governance” and public policy in not only India,  but also the USA,
Canada, Europe, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, China and Pakistan (Gulzar and
Wang 2010). The peculiar form of the HUF as a distinct form of property holding for the
purpose of corporate governance and taxation has only recently been recognized in the
literature (Dewan 2009; Das Gupta 2013; Das Gupta 2016).
7 The legal provisions of “corporate governance” structures have facilitated the optimum
mix  of  various  forms  of  registered  companies  such  as  partnerships,  private  limited
companies,  unregistered and registered public limited companies under the umbrella
group  through  interlocking  share-holdings.  These  interlockings  were  made  possible
through the legal provisions of the Indian Partnerships Act of 1932 and the Companies
Act of 1956. This not only was a mode of risk spreading, but also provided legal avenues to
escape the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices after 1973, until it was repealed in
1991.  It  was  also  important  for  labor  deployment  and control  with employers,  often
ensuring  that  each  company  had  less  than  seven  employees  and  pre-empting  any
possibility of trade-union formation under the stipulations of the Trade Union Act of 1926
(Das Gupta 2016).
8 In corporate law and personal law—the two spaces it inhabits—the HUF has been largely
regarded as incongruent with “modern” corporate governance and taxation structures
(Sachdeva 1987). It is often referred to as a remnant from an archaic time that does not
serve  any  purpose  in  contemporary  modes  of  capital  accumulation.  The  women’s
movement in India, which has had the closest critical engagement with this structure has
The Hindu Undivided Family in Independent India’s Corporate Governance and Ta...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 15 | 2017
3
often associated it with feudal structures of land and property holdings. Its implications
for capital accumulation in the “modern” sectors have not been studied at all. This paper
is an attempt to arrive at a comprehensive delineation of the role of the HUF in the
corporate governance and taxation regime in independent India.
9 Interlocked firms and families are the legal structure in which capital accumulation is
institutionally embedded in India. It may also be noted that the first level of the firm/
family interlock is germane to capitalism universally, i.e. individual members of families
own and control shares. But in India, the HUF interlock with firms is unique and specific
in not only maintaining the family’s control over the family business, but also driving a
range of  activities  related to capital  accumulation which do not  get  captured in the
taxation structure. Moreover, this privilege as a legal entity is only given to Hindus as
defined in the state’s codification of Hindu personal and family law—a Hindu is anyone
who is not a Muslim, Parsi, Christian or Jew.
10  The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. Section I elucidates the process
through which the HUF was institutionally  embedded into the state’s  codification of
Hindu personal and family law. Section II analyzes the institutional embedding of the
HUF in corporate governance structures. Section III dwells on installation and use of the
HUF  in  tax  structures  and  the  role  it  plays  as  a  vital  institution  in  tax  avoidance
processes. The three sections together show the critical role the HUF plays in the circuits
of capital accumulation in India.
 
Installation of the HUF through the Hindu Code
11 The codification of Hindu Personal laws continued for more than nine years from 1947 to
1956 as part of the exercise of nation-building. The original draft of the bill by Dr. B R
Ambedkar (who resigned from the Union Cabinet in protest after agreeing to many of the
changes that were inserted at various stages of the debate) was watered down through
political compromise and was finally broken down into four separate acts on marriage,
guardianship, succession and adoption which were passed in Parliament between 1955
and 1956. Big capitalists played a significant part in the process through which Hindu
personal law became state law in India in 1956 (Das Gupta 2013; Das Gupta 2016).
12 The first step towards the legal sanctification of the HUF as the institutional basis for
organization  of  the  business  group  was  achieved  through  the  codification  of  Hindu
personal laws. First, the Hindu code (adopted as state code) defined a Hindu as anyone
who was not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew and thus by default included followers of
other  institutionalized  religions  like  Buddhism,  Jainism  and  Sikhism  in  the  Hindu
category, along with a range of theistic practices outside the domain of organized religion
like those of adivasis. Thus the onus was placed on the individual to prove if necessary
that she/he is not a Hindu (Das Gupta 2016).
13 The same code recognized both Dayabhaga and Mitakshara—the two forms of customary
caste-Hindu property holdings (a compromise over the original draft which had proposed
to do away with customary laws in defining hereditary rights to property)—and marriage
only between two Hindus (according to hetero-normative customary law based on caste
rules and practices on both endogamy and exogamy) as falling within the ambit of the
code. Adoption and succession were to be defined in jurisprudence by the state’s Hindu
code, institutionalizing male lineage of descent as the “natural” inheritors of property
The Hindu Undivided Family in Independent India’s Corporate Governance and Ta...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 15 | 2017
4
and the expropriation of any right to property of children born outside marriage. Thus,
Hindu personal law became state law, embedding the definition of the Hindu Undivided
Family.
14 The  patriarchal  basis  of  the  property-rights  structure  was  institutionalized  in  the
organization of wealth and property. Women were denied an equal share in any property.
Specifically,  they  were  denied  any  property  right  to  land  on  the  feeble  excuse  of
preventing the “fragmentation of land.” Thus with the aid of two definitions, that of a
Hindu  and  that  of  the  HUF,  religion,  caste  and  patriarchy  were  installed  as  the
institutional  basis  of determining  property  rights.  The  modification  of  the  right  to
property as a statutory right guaranteed by the Constitution, in favor of Hindu males
through the creation of the legal entity of the HUF, was the most significant intervention
of the first post-independence decade (Das Gupta 2013).
15 The impact of this institutional arrangement became evident as soon as the codification
was completed in 1956, with a sudden spurt in the proliferation of HUFs. The annual
growth of the number of HUFs jumped to 38% in 1957–58 when the growth of all tax
entities amounted to 16%. The average annual growth rate of HUF accounts between
1954–55 and 1965–66 was 9% while all tax entities grew at close to 12%. In this period,
HUFs on average accounted for 6% to 8% of tax assessees and 5% to 8% of the total income
assessed (Statistical Abstract of India, All India Income Tax Statistics, Various Years).
16 The  codification  of  Hindu  personal  laws  preserved  the  patriarchal  rules  of  limiting
women’s rights to inherit property and assigned the “karta”—the eldest patriarch of the
family—legal  powers  to  represent  and  make  decisions  to  structure  the  holding  of
property (Sachdeva 1987). In case law (based on the Hindu code adopted by the state), an
HUF consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their
wives and unmarried daughters, while a Hindu co-parcenary is a much narrower body
including only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or co-parcenary
property. Before the 2005 amendment, the Hindu Succession Act made a provision for a
Hindu Undivided Family in order to ensure that property would remain with the male
line of descent. As a co-parcenary, a son got a share equal to that of his father; a daughter
got only a share in her father’s share. She could not reside in the family home unless she
was single or divorced, and could not claim her share of property as long as the men of
the family continued to live in it. Further, a woman’s right to agricultural property was
still  denied to “prevent fragmentation of  landholdings” (Das Gupta 2016).  Contrary to
assertions  that  the  2005  amendment  “established  a  gender-equal  basis  of  land  and
agricultural property” (Kelkar 2014), it gave only daughters the right to be co-parcenaries
in HUFs under Mitakshara rules, and excluded wives and daughters-in-law (Singh 2005).
Moreover, the status of the “karta” and the HUF as a form of property holding in a body
incorporate were not affected by this amendment. The status of the karta was preserved
in its  implication for inheritance rights as well  as  the HUF as a tax entity (which is
elaborated in the last section).
17 It  created the formal  legal  space for  any Hindu male to break away from the “joint
family” and start a new “Hindu Undivided Family” as karta as long as he was married.
Even as families went nuclear, the “HUF” could be perpetuated as a legal entity, as each
nuclear family marked the beginning of a new “HUF” because a Hindu male can be a “
karta” for more than one HUF accounts. So every time a joint property is partitioned or a
joint family breaks up into nuclear units, it gives rise to a new “Undivided” family. Thus
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the expansion of the HUF through male lineage is the only pre-condition to the formation
of new HUFs.
 
The HUF in Corporate Governance
18 In 1956, the Companies Act recognized the HUF as a legal entity in independent India
which could be part of ownership and control structures of corporate entities, i.e. private
and public  limited companies.  The Indian Partnership Act  of  1932 had already given
similar  recognition  to  the  HUF  in  holding  structures  of  partnership  firms.  The
interlocking of the HUF with corporate governance structures is mediated by the role of
the karta in his dual role—as an individual legal person and as karta of the HUF. For
instance, a HUF cannot enter into a partnership with other persons, as it is not a legal
person, but the karta of a HUF can (Sachdeva 1987). Similarly the karta and the other
members of a HUF are entitled to receive a salary and compensation as a legal person.
Also an HUF can be a proprietor of one or more business firms by maintaining names
separate to the HUF as a business entity. Further the HUF can own different kinds of
assets including factories, land, property and trades. This legal interlock of the HUF with
companies and firms is central to the holding asset structures of Hindu family-owned
business groups in India. Both “old” and “new” capitalist business houses of Hindu origin
use the provision of HUF to consolidate family holdings and ensure the control of capital
within the family through transactions between the HUF and individuals within the HUF,
these individuals occupying key positions in the share-holding and managerial patterns
of  the  companies  within  the  fold  of  the  business  house,  through  interlocking
directorships and share-holding.
19 One  of  the  most  important  features  of  the  “old”  regime  of  accumulation  was  the
mercantile basis of Indian family-owned business groups. The few explanations for this
phenomenon have been rooted in the realm of either “behavioralism” or “culturalism.”
While on the other hand, the studies of “new” capitalists—which have been emphasizing
the  diversification  of  the  regimes  of  accumulation  between  1956  and  1980  (e.g.
Damodaran 2008)—have  missed  out  on  the  one  unchanging  feature  of  the  “business
group,”  which  is  its  ability  to  retain  control  over  diverse  ventures  with  very  little
investment of family wealth.
20 The distinction between ownership and control gets blurred in the complexity of holding
structures, through the maze of inter-corporate holdings and interlocking directorships
(Mazumdar 2006). The interlocking of the HUF into overlapping directorships and inter-
corporate holdings provides yet another layer for ensuring family control over corporate
governance structures, apart from providing an avenue for concessions on wealth and
income. In the absence of any official account of such interlocked holdings, case law is
one avenue through which this relationship can be studied. Our analysis of twenty five
landmark HUF related cases involving some of the top business houses in India shows the
following uses of the HUF:
1. To keep property within the Hindu family (based on the male line of descent) using the
definition of the Hindu as adopted in the Acts based on the Hindu Code.
2. Splitting of income between individuals and HUFs for the purpose of tax avoidance.
3. To evade large amount of  taxes by entering into complex transaction between HUF and
Group Companies with same person as karta and chairman respectively.
4. To gain benefits of tax exemptions in capital gains.
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5. Holding land of enormous value in HUFs claiming to be received as dowry by ancestors
6. Interlocking of funds and assets between HUFs and group companies
7. To make a profit from speculation through sale and purchase of shares of group companies
by the HUF.
8. Multiple  HUFs  within  the  same  family  with  overlapping  kartas  and  members  and  then
multiple  dealings  of  a  single  property  by these different  HUF eg same land pledged for
different purposes by repeated transfers between HUF holders.
21 The case law analysis summarized above is indicative rather than exhaustive. However, it
does bring out the peculiar provisions of the HUF that “Hindu” business houses have used
in different spatial and temporal contexts to perpetuate capital accumulation. Needless to
say, no such provision was available to business houses held by Muslims or Christians,
Parsis or Jews. While the interlocking characteristics of family-owned trusts are used by
business groups from all religions, the HUF is a favor exclusively for Hindus as defined by
the  Hindu  code.  There  is  no  equivalent  structure  or  provision  for  business  groups
belonging to other religions.
22 The other method through which the HUF can be studied is through survey. Using snow-
ball  sampling  techniques,  we  carried  out  a  survey  of  financial  statements  and
institutional interlocks of 150 business groups in two phases between 2003 and 2005 and
between 2008 and 2011. This survey consisted of 150 business families, the study of the
financial statements of the last ten years of 7,500 firms affiliated to these 150 business
families. This survey also involved 1,000 extensive interviews with members of business
families, and managers and employees in family-controlled firms. These interviews were
based on written and/or oral consent based on the condition that no identities would be
revealed in the study.
23 The survey (spread over Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi and Hyderabad) reveals judicious use of
provisions in personal and corporate governance laws,  with each group consisting of
some or all of the legal forms of partnership firms, private limited companies, unlisted
public limited companies and listed public limited companies (using the provisions of the
1932  Partnerships  Act  and  of  the  1956  Companies  Act).  The  holding  structures  are
comprised  of  individually-owned stocks,  along  with  stocks  held  by  Hindu Undivided
Family  accounts  (except  for  the  two  business  groups  of  “non-Hindu”  origin  in  our
Survey),1 and a number of “group” companies spread across the four forms of business
entities stated above. In 35.3 percent of the groups surveyed, stocks in group companies
are not held by HUFs in publicly-listed companies, but are held in the “private limited”
companies. However, the kartas of the HUF or other HUF members hold stocks in the
publicly listed companies in 61.3 percent of the groups surveyed. Thus the payouts to the
HUF as well as to the individual who is part of an HUF is simultaneously maintained. At
the same time, the HUF can hold other property, e.g. houses, cash, gold, share certificates,
fixed deposits which would not be considered in the asset accounting of the business
group. The income and wealth holdings in the HUF do not get counted in the business
group’s ownership and control of assets (Das Gupta 2016).
 
Table 2.1: Survey Summary
Number of business families surveyed 150
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Number  of  firms  affiliated  to  business  groups  which  were  analyzed  for  institutional
interlocks
7,500
Average number of companies/firms in a family-owned/controlled business group 47
Average number of HUFs found to be interlocked in each business group 9
Average  number  of  trusts/registered  societies  found  to  be  interlocked  with  each
business group
4
Number of detailed case studies of family owned business groups 25
Number of members of business families interviewed as part of case studies 300
Number of managers of firms interviewed as part of case studies 300
Number of employees who were not managers interviewed as part of case studies 200
24 Thus, on an average, for every five firms controlled by a family-owned business group,
there is one HUF to play the pivotal role of legal facilitation of family control over the
holding structures of family-owned business groups.
 
Family Control over the Circuits of Capital within the Business
Group
25 The provision of the HUF is used to consolidate family holdings and ensure the control of
capital within the family through transactions between the HUF and individuals within
the HUF who hold key positions in the share-holding and managerial patterns of the
companies within the fold of the business house, through interlocking directorships and
share-holding.
26 To illustrate  the  modalities  of  family  control  over  the  circuits  of  capital  within  the
business group, we present a case study from our survey of a family-owned business
group based in Mumbai:
27 Patriarch A from business family X is married to B from business family Y. They have two
sons C and D and one daughter E. C and D have a son each named M and N. Daughter E is
married to F into business family Z. Sons C and D are married to G and H from business
families V and W.
28 The HUFs created from these alliances in Family X are:
1. HUF1 (A –karta, C and D coparcenaries, B member):
2. HUF2 (C – karta, G member)
3. HUF3 (D- karta, H member)
4. HUF 4 (A-karta, C - coparcenary, B and G member)
5. HUF 5 (A-karta, D – coparcenary, B and H member)
6. HUF 6 (C – karta, M coparcenery (minor with C as guardian)
7. HUF 7 (D – karta, N coparcenary (minor with D as guardian)
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29 Similar HUFs exist in families V, W and Z. Family X has two flagship companies—ABC Ltd
and DEF Ltd. Five percent of the shares in ABC Ltd are held by A, B and C. Another three
percent shares are owned between HUFs 1, 2 and 4. Similarly, six percent of the shares in
DEF Ltd are held by A and D. Another two percent is held by HUFs 1, 3 and 5. Eight other
group companies together hold a ten percent share of ABC Ltd. Seven different group
companies hold an eleven percent share of DEF Ltd.  There are two other subsidiary/
holding companies in the group. These hold shares in nine other group companies. HUFs
6 and 7 hold a two percent share in ten of the group companies. Two group companies
along with A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H hold shares in three trusts named after A’s grandfather,
father and mother respectively. These trusts own shares in six group companies. The
HUFs belonging to families V, Y, W have shares in six group companies. The daughter,
son-in-law and the daughters-in-law (E,  F,  G and H) own shares as individuals in six
corporate  entities  in  which  three  are  partnerships  and  three  are  companies.  Thus
individuals,  HUFS,  firms/companies  and  trusts  form  multiple  levels  of  overlapping
interlocks  to  control  26  firms/companies  and two trusts,  even though each of  these
entities is governed by different corporate governance laws as we have shown earlier.
30 A, the patriarch is a director in six companies, The sons C, D and son-in-law F in four
each, the daughter E in two, three members each from families V, W and Y in two each.
All the women in the family are involved in active management of the trusts in a position
of executive authority.  Had there been no HUF provision,  individual  family members
would need to own a much larger proportion of  the shares in order to exert  family
control over the constituent firms/companies in the business group.
31 This business group owned two large and six medium sized factories and two small scale
enterprises spread over four states in India.  Out of these,  two were owned by public
limited companies, four were owned by private limited companies, two by HUFs and two
by partnerships. These factories were integrated into the global textiles value chain at
different levels, with a production range of intermediate goods. Fifteen other corporate
entities in the group were shown to be invested in hotels, trading, property dealing and
leasing,  and  entertainment  (a  digital  studio).  One  partnership  firm  was  invested  in
financial services while the trusts ran for-profit schools along with temples, an old-age
home and an ecological  park.  However,  on an average,  sixteen out of  the twenty-six
corporate entities  reported losses  in the previous four years.  With asset  and income
transfers within group companies and HUFs (through related party transactions which
are captured in the financial statements), profit and loss accounting was spread across
business  groups  to  declare  the  minimum  level  of  profits  to  avoid  taxation  in  nine
consecutive years from 2002–03 to 2010–11.
32 The HUF also exists  legally in tax law independent of  these interlocked entities.  For
example, the land for three of the factories is owned by three different HUFs of family X
and is shown in financial statements to have been leased to the company owning the
factory.
33 A similar case study of the largest business group in India by Naz (2016),  shows that
around 64 out of 88 interlocked group companies,  reported a loss in two consecutive
years in 2013 and 2014. It must be noted here that such related party transactions must
by law be approved by the Board of the company. Given the interlock between family
members on the board,  such transactions are facilitated by the legal  sanction of  the
corporate governance structure interlocked with the family (Naz 2016).
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34 Our interviews with the mother, daughter and daughters-in-law (B, E, G and H) revealed
significant  aspects  of  the  firm/family  interlock.  All  four  women  had  been  married
through alliances brokered by the family.  Two of the four women were married into
families whose ethnicity was different from their own. However, all four alliances were
based on caste rules of endogamy/exogamy along with considerations of class status. All
four  women  narrated  how they  were  part  of  fundraising  (own  capital)  for  multiple
business groups spanning the families inter-connected through marriage.  They called
these  “deposits,”  which were  made by  women either  informally  in  cash or  formally
through personal cheques from their own bank accounts to one or another HUF. These
would then be channeled through the HUF into various related party transactions to fund
the purchase of land, investment in machinery or stocks and bonds, all of which then are
used  in  the  accumulation  activities  of  group  companies.  These  deposits  return,
completing the circuit  of  capital  at  higher than the original  value through the same
circuitous routes as family income, very much in keeping with Marx’s original exposition
of M-M’ i.e. the social relation of capital as money begetting more money than its original
value (Marx 1887). As the monetary transactions are between the HUF and the individual,
these never show up in the accounts books of  the corporate entities.  Thus the legal
separation of  the individual,  the  HUF of  which the individual  is  a  member,  and the
company in which the HUF and the individual exert ownership and control, create the
formal legal structure in which the informality of exchange between members of the
family to generate and accumulate capital is embedded.
35 Within  the  structure  of  the  family-owned  business  group,  the  importance  of  Hindu
Undivided Family  assets  have  not  declined,  even as  many of  the  business  groups  in
question have forged relationships  based on technological  dependence and spates  of
mergers with and acquisitions of both indigenous and foreign companies.  It  has only
meant that the wealth holdings in the HUF cannot be used for controlling stakes in the
merged foreign entity, as opposed to the wealth held through “corporate governance”
structures. But the interlocking of HUFs in “Hindu” corporate entities still makes it a
vehicle for family control over all the operations and stakes of the “corporate” business
group  and  continuous  rearrangement  of  liabilities  and  tax  obligations  between
individuals and the HUFs. In absolute terms, the number of HUF assessees almost doubled
between 1991 and 2000 from around two hundred thousand to four hundred thousand.
The number of HUFs assessed for income tax increased by 47% in 1997–98 as compared to
the previous year and registered double-digit annual growth rates in eight out of twenty
years between 1990–91 and 2009–10. As per the latest income tax data released by the
Central Board of Direct Taxes in 2016 there were 9,40,061 effective HUF assessees in 2014–
15 that had appeared in the income tax statistics while their number stood at 4,47,820 in
1999–200, the year after which disaggregated data was not provided; disaggregated data
was not provided beyond this date. So even as per official statistics the number of HUFs
has almost doubled within a decade and increased almost four-fold since 1991.
36 Table 2.2 compares the disaggregated growth rates of HUFs with that of companies and
firms (i.e. partnerships and sole-proprietorships) added together. In seven out of thirteen
years for which comparable data is available, the number of HUFs has grown faster than
that of firms. In the three years during which the number of companies and firms has
shown an annual decline, the HUF has also shown a decline. Thus the growth of the HUF
is similar to that of firms and companies and distinctly different from individual tax
assessees whose growth rate has exceeded 100% in all the thirteen years for which we
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have comparable data (Table 2.2). This feature has to do with the “business” entity of the
HUF, which is further elaborated later in this section.
 
Table 2.2: Annual Growth Rates of HUFs Compared to Companies and Firms after 1991
Year
Annual  Growth  of
HUFs (%)
Annual  Growth  of  Firms  and
Companies (%)
Annual  Growth  of
Individuals (%)
1990–91 10.82 15.57 114.34
1991–92 –8.93 –5.70 105.99
1992–93 11.31 1.13 115.69
1993–94 7.98 4.54 112.76
1994–95 24.79 28.05 137.81
1995–96 –3.62 –2.22 101.03
1996–97 –6.31 –7.60 108.41
1997–98 47.13 26.61 122.99




2012–13 87.59 18.14 203.09
2013–14 6.86 4.77 116.11
2014–15 4.72 7.43 108.72
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data released by Central Board of Direct Taxes, Various Years
37 Socially,  nuclearization  of  families  is  directly  combined  with  proliferation  of  HUF
accounts among middle-class, double-income, upwardly-mobile, caste-Hindu India. One
of the features associated with the neoliberal era has been that family-owned business
groups have been transforming themselves into multi-nationals without an increase in
their total corporate liability through vertical and horizontal integration. This is possible
because the laws in India have been suitably altered to facilitate such transformation of
firms in the period of contemporary globalization by the reduction of the compulsory
share of Indian partners in a transnational venture, the introduction of limited liability
partnerships,  the  dismantling  of  the  MRTP  and  FERA  Acts,  and  amendments  in  the
National  Patent  Act  to  make  it  amenable  to  the  WTO  regime  of  product  patents
(Das Gupta 2010). However, the laws relating to holding structures of companies remain
flexible enough to accommodate the requisites of change in corporate governance but are
unchanging in their function of providing the legitimate basis of family-owned business
groups spanning the entire domain of ownership, control and individual- and family-
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based appropriation of profit in favor of the “Hindu,” defined as anyone who is not a
Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew (Das Gupta 2016).
38 In the post liberalization period, it also provides yet another channel of “tax-saving” on
income and wealth for not only upwardly-mobile “Hindu” families in India, but also for
Hindu Non Resident Indians (NRI). The 1961 Income Tax Act specifies the residency status
of  citizens  and  entities  into  three  broad  categories—resident,  nonresident  and  not
ordinarily  resident  (NOR).  This  trilateral  categorization  also  existed  in  the  colonial
Income Tax Act of 1922. The 1939 amendment to the 1922 Income Tax Act allowed “NOR”
status for individuals only. For the HUF and other assessees, the status was restricted to
ordinary residents. It was only with the 1961 Income Tax Act that NOR status, which was
earlier available only to individuals, was extended to the HUF in Section 6(6)(b), which
provides that a HUF can be NOR if the manager is an NRI and has stayed outside India in
nine out of ten previous years or has remained in the country for less than 729 days in
past 7 years. This legally allows business families to register a HUF in India, conduct their
business abroad for years and establish the presence of the manager of the HUF in the
country for the minimum stipulated period to enjoy the benefits of the HUF (for instance
if a father and his two sons have a HUF, the father can return to India occasionally while
his sons continue to do business abroad). The residential status of an individual has to be
established by physical presence in the country over a certain time. But for the other
corporate governance structures having a separate legal existence, the residential status
was extended under the Income Tax Act on the basis of establishing management and
control in the country, a caveat which by definition brings in an element of ambiguity.
The HUF was treated on par with corporate entities on this point and the provision that
was meant for firms also applied to the HUF. This was in continuity with the 1922 colonial
Income Tax Act. Subsequently, Section 6(2) of the 1961 Income Tax Act provided that a
HUF is  recognized as  a  resident  in India  in every case,  except  when its  control  and
management is situated wholly outside India. This provision goes a step further than the
earlier provision where the manager or karta has to establish presence for a brief period.
This allows the karta to reside outside the country. HUF benefits can be taken advantage
of as long as there is an official devolution of the powers of control and management to
the other members of the family who stay in the country.
39 Thus  the  interlock  of  the  caste-Hindu  patriarchal  family  with  corporate  governance
institutions is formally embedded in law in India.  It  is the materiality of capital  that
forges the social entity of the family-owned business group, which is formally, legally
embedded  in  the  seamless  interlock  of  the  firm  and  the  family.  This  spans  state
codification of Hindu family law, corporate governance laws and taxation laws. Moreover,
this unique legal family/firm interlock is not available to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or
Jews and hence constitutes a perverse legal privilege for the Hindu family. The caste-
Hindu  patriarchal  family  bound  by  son  preference  is  an  imperative  of  the  social
reproduction of institutional accumulation structures in India. Trust and informality of
kinship and familial  relationships are very much “within the law.” It  is capital  in its
material social role, at work in the circuit of financial and capital flows, that drives the
network of institutions that constitute the “family-owned business group” in India, which
is legally and formally undergirded by caste, patriarchy and religion.
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Installation and Uses of the HUF in Tax Structures
40 The recognition of the Hindu Undivided Family as a legal tax entity, separate and distinct
from individuals and corporates (which were firms defined under the Companies Act and
the Partnership Act), was the final step in defining the legal entity of the HUF. While all
other  corporate  bodies  recognized  in  corporate  and  individual  income  tax  laws  are
defined on the basis of company law, the HUF as a legal entity in Indian tax law is defined
on the basis of Hindu personal law. After defining the HUF through the codification of
personal laws in 1955–56, the state then took the next step to perpetuate the “Hindu
Undivided Family” (HUF) as an entity recognized by the 1957 Wealth Tax Act and Section
2  of  the  1961  Income Tax  Act,  as  a  distinct  unit  of  taxation,  with  the  grant  of  tax
avoidance facilities on “family income,” with higher exemptions and lower tax rates as
compared to other categories of assessees. Under the income and wealth tax laws in India,
an  HUF  is  assessed  for  tax  as  a  distinct  unit  of  assessment  and  its  interlocking
relationship with other income- and wealth-generating entities like companies and firms
is not taken into account in the calculation of tax liability.
41 Though the HUF was recognized in colonial income-tax laws earlier (discussed in the
introduction), in 1936, the Ayers Committee mentioned the need for recognition of the
HUF but did warn of substantive revenue loss if any special exemptions were granted. It is
significant that a decade later such a consideration did not prevail over the committees
which were constituted to make recommendations on direct taxation after independence.
Some of these committees justified the preferential tax treatment to the HUF and further
recommended higher tax exemptions than other assessees as an incentive for remaining
a joint unit.2 Others either did not mention or failed to provide a solution, citing reasons
like  the  administrative  burden  involved,  except  for  two  significant  exceptions—the
Wanchoo Committee and the K. N. Raj Committee.3 Hence the tax provisions served the
objective of preserving the interest of the capital-owning class of caste-Hindu origin by
offering a plethora of  special  concessions under the aegis  of  the HUF.  The Wanchoo
Committee report was scathing in its assessment of the purpose of the HUF. It held that:
“We feel convinced that the Hindu Undivided Family as a unit of assessment is retained in
most cases only when it enables the person concerned to reduce their tax liability and
that  in  other  cases,  it  is  promptly  partitioned  without  considerations  of  sentiments
coming in the way.”
42 A member of a HUF is not taxable at for any sum which s/he receives as a HUF member
out of the income of the family, even though the family may not have paid any tax on its
own income. So the privilege cannot be ascertained by how much tax a HUF pays, but by
how much of its income is not taxed at all by virtue of being declared as “family income.”
Moreover,  an individual  can organize  her/his  wealth across  multiple  HUFs  and thus
reduce her/his effective tax liability.
 
Use of the HUF for Tax Avoidance
43 There is a distinction between statutory and effective taxation rates. The statutory rates
of taxes are defined by the government for various categories of assessees.  Statutory
income tax rates are defined by the government annually as part of the annual budget
announcements through tax slabs based on income declared. These tax slabs are defined
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in terms of a certain percentage of income, which increases with increasing intervals of
income  threshold.  There  is  a  difference  between  the  statutory  rates,  which  are
announced every year by modification of the Finance Act, and what finally translates into
the actual payments as taxes by income tax payers. These actual payments as percentage
of declared income are called the effective tax rates (Bandyopadhyay 2012;  Rao 2015).
Hence there is a fine distinction made between effective and statutory tax rates (where
the statutory rates are the ones prescribed by law and the effective tax rates are the
realized average tax rates). For instance in a comparison of the Transitional economies
with an advanced one like the EU, the ratio between these two tax forms (effective and
statutory)  for  direct  and  indirect  taxes  was  taken  as  basis  for  analyzing  the  tax
administration  and  policy  prescriptions  (Schaffer  and  Turley 2001).  Therefore
algebraically, the effective rate of taxes which can be described as the actual tax payable
by an assessee as a proportion of the income/profit before taxes can be assessed. The very
construction of effective tax rates then makes them lower as opposed to the statutory
rates prescribed by the government if the level of exemptions for tax assessees is high. It
is also important to mention here that the percentage of effective tax rates gets lower on
account of exemptions, subsidies and rebates, which can be both implicit and explicit.
Exemptions are granted for investments in pension funds, insurance policies, government
bonds,  housing  loans  etc.  The  taxable  units  circumvent  the  mandatory/statutory
payments by deploying various ways to lower effective tax rates (ETR) using exemptions.
However the HUF provides a further mechanism for tax avoidance for Hindu business
families. Table 3.1 presents statutory tax rates reduced to a scale of Rs 100 as equivalent
to Rs 10,00,000.
 
Table 3.1: Statutory Tax Rates in India: 2015–16
Income Tax Slab Income Tax Rate
Income  Reduced  to
Unit of Rs 100
Actual  Tax  to  be  paid
on Income
Income  up  to  Rs.
2,50,000
Nil 25 0
Income  between  Rs.
2,50,001 - Rs. 500,000
10%  of  Income
exceeding Rs. 2,50,000
25–50 < or =2.5
Income  between  Rs.
500,001 - Rs. 10,00,000
20%  of  Income
exceeding Rs. 5,00,000
50–100 >2.5 and < or = 10
Income  above  Rs.
10,00,000




As  per  actual  income
exceeding Rs 100
Note: Rates are for 2015–16 as per the 2016 Finance Act 
44 Let us start with a Hindu business family that consists of Patriarch A, his wife B, two sons
C and D and daughter E. Let us say the family controls a firm called Patriarch & Sons
(P&S) in which the father is the owner/manager and has an annual income of Rs 100 from
this firm. If there is no HUF provision, A will pay no tax on the first Rs 25 of the annual
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income, Rs 2.5 for the next Rs 25 and Rs 10 for the next Rs 50 that he earns. So on his total
income of Rs 100, he would pay Rs 12.5. So his ETR would be 12.5%.
45 However, because there is the legal HUF provision, A will form an HUF with himself as
karta, his sons and daughter—C, D and E—as co-parcenaries and his wife B as member. Let
us call this HUF 1. Using firm/family interlocks (described in Section II), he will report Rs
50 as income of the HUF and Rs 50 as his own individual income. Since the tax law does
not  recognize  the  relationship  between  the  individual  and  the  HUF,  these  separate
entities each will be taxed as follows. The HUF will pay no tax on the first Rs 25 and will
pay Rs 2.5 on the second Rs 25, i.e. the HUF tax liability for an income of Rs 50 will be Rs
2.5, which is an effective tax rate of 5%. The same rates apply to individuals. So A as
individual on his reported income of Rs 50 will also pay Rs 2.5 as income tax which is an
ETR of 5%. Thus by the combination of one individual, one firm and one HUF, effective
income tax liability can be brought down from 12.5% to 5%.
46 Let us say A’s income from P&S increases to Rs 300 in the next year. His total tax liability
would be none for the first Rs 25, Rs 2.5 for the next Rs 25, Rs. 10 for the next Rs 50 and Rs
60 for the Rs 200 rest of his income. This would be a total tax liability of Rs 72.5 on an
individual income of Rs 300 which implies an effective tax rate of 24.2%. It is at this stage
that two more HUFs would be formed if and only if the two sons are married:
• HUF1 (Described earlier)
• HUF2 (A karta, C co-parcenary, C’s wife member)
• HUF3 (A karta, D co-parcenary, D’s wife member)
47 Using firm/family interlocks, the Rs 300 would be now spread over 3 HUFs and A as an
individual in income reporting. This Rs 300 can be distributed among these four entities
in  various  ways.  Chartered  accountants  of  P&S  would  work  out  the  details  of  the
apportioning to minimize ETR. One way would be to report Rs 50 each as income of each
HUF. So each HUF would pay Rs 2.5 as tax on Rs 50, i.e. Rs 7.5 on Rs 150. A would show his
income as Rs 150, on which he would have to pay no tax on the first Rs 25, Rs 2.5 on the
next Rs 25, Rs 10 on the next Rs 50 and Rs 15 on the last Rs 50. So he would pay a total tax
of Rs 27.5. All entities together pay only Rs 35 as tax on the same income of Rs 300. The
ETR reduces from 24.2% (in the absence of HUF) to 11.67% through judicious use of HUF
provisions. If A had three married sons and no daughter, he would be able to form an
additional HUF and reduce tax liabilities further. If any of the sons do not get married,
then the possibility of forming the additional HUFs reduces. Thus son preference and
hetero-normative marriages in every generation, bound by caste and religious rules as
per the state’s Hindu code, have a very material incentive in the form of the HUF tax
provisions in India.
 
Trends in Effective Direct Taxation of Income: the HUF Compared to
Other Categories
48 The  problem  of  direct  tax  mobilization  in  India  in  the  post-liberalization  phase  is
attributed  to  high  rates  of  taxation  and  sources  of  “inefficiency”  traced  to  the
administrative structure of  taxation and proliferation of  multiple  taxes.  Thus,  in the
architecture of tax reforms, the emphasis has been on the “rationalization” of taxes and
tax rates4 (Rao and Singh 2005). Along with this, the post-liberalization period has seen
tax  exemptions  and  tax  subsidies  being  awarded  to  corporates  (Mazumdar 2014;
Rao 2015) as a major incentivizing policy tool. This process has generated a large amount
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of opinion without consistent empirical evidence of the fall-outs on effective rates of
taxation. One reason for the lack of empirical evidence is the significant change in the
process of data dissemination on direct taxes in India. The Central Board of Direct Taxes
(CBDT) under the Ministry of Finance has stopped releasing state level data classified by
taxation units after 1989–90.  It  has also stopped disseminating national-level  data on
actual income assessed and tax collected for various taxation units after 1999–2000. After
a long gap and in the face of mounting criticism, in April 2016 the CBDT released partial
data for three years (2012 to 2015).Within these constraints, we have compiled taxation
data from various volumes of the Statistical Abstract of India and computed effective
rates of taxation for the different units of direct income taxation in India. An attempt has
also been made to incorporate the plausible analysis of the latest direct tax data released
by the CBDT in October 2016, which is being celebrated as a step towards transparency of
tax data in India after more than a decade of non availability of disaggregated tax data.
But this data suffers from various limitations and hides more than it reveals; an analysis
of this is outside the scope of the present discussion. Suffice it to note that the time series
from 2001 to 2011 lumps HUF tax data under “other direct taxes.” It is only for the years
2012–15 that disaggregated data for the various categories of assessees are available with
no distinction between tax payable and actual tax paid. Banerjee and Piketty (2004) used
the same data set (called All India Income Tax Statistics) generated by CBDT (which we
have used in this paper). They have used it to compute the top shares of income in India
from 1922  to  2000.  Their  data-set  ends  in  2000  as  the  CBDT did  not  make tax  data
available since then until very recently. Observing that the share of HUFs is just 5% of
total  assessees,  Banerjee  and Piketty  (2004)  had merged the  HUF assessees  with  the
individual assessees for defining tax units in their analysis. For them the HUF is the same
as an individual which is exactly the Indian state’s understanding since 1961. This is why
in the contemporary tax structure individual and HUF assessees are treated on par as we
have argued so far. Our difference with Banerjee and Piketty (2004) lies in our conceptual
critique of not recognizing the HUF as a unique mode of firm-family interlock distinct
from individuals which we have illustrated through our discussions so far. It must be
noted that the significance of the HUF lies not in how much tax it pays, but in how much
wealth it  owns on which it  does not  pay taxes by claiming it  as  “family income” as
illustrated earlier.
49 Ramanujam a former Chief Commissioner of Income Tax argued that axioms of tax law
are based on the assumption that nobody can make a profit out of one’s self. The entity of
the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is an exception to this principle. He noted after the
2005 amendment to the Hindu Code that the HUF is an entity peculiar to the Indian tax
law. There is “nothing sham” about it. He succinctly argued that the “government carries
out any amount of amendment to the Hindu law without looking into the revenue loss
caused by the recognition of the HUF as a separate taxable entity. The HUF may be a boon
to  the  taxpaying  Hindu.  But  it  is  definitely  a  bane  to  government  revenues”
(Ramanujam 2006). The reporting of taxation data reflects the dichotomy of taxation and
corporate  governance  structures  in  India.  Thus  taxation  assumes  five  types  of  units
(individuals,  HUFs,  firms  [sole  proprietorships  and partnerships],  corporates  [limited
liability companies], and AOP/BOI [Association of Persons/Body of Individuals]) which are
reported as separate and distinct without any relationship to each other. On the other
hand, our analysis of the institutional structure of corporate governance shows that the
institution of  the family-owned business  group operates  through a  complex maze of
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interlocked ownership and control across all the five categories. The various reports on
tax reforms in the last twenty years also reflect this dichotomy in which the institutional
assumptions  of  corporate  tax  rationalization  completely  occlude  the  purview  of  the
system of self-rationalized tax avoidance offered by the interlocking tax entities. Thus,
analyses based on sources like the PROWESS database capture the larger picture of 60–
71% of “firms” (limited liability companies) reporting positive profit before taxes and
showing effective taxation rates below 25% in the last five-year period, and also confirm
the observation that larger firms face lower effective tax rates (Rao 2015).  While this
corroborates our findings discussed below, our point of departure from both Banerjee
and Piketty (2004) and Rao (2015) is based on the observation that such studies do not
differentiate  the  type  of  “firm,”  the  interlocking  relationships  between “firms,”  and
between firms  and HUFs  (and AOI/BOIs);  hence  they do not  capture  the  differential
impact  of  tax policy on different  but  inter-locked tax entities.  Nonetheless,  the data
reveals some significant features of the Hindu Undivided Family which are incorporated
in the discussion that follows.
50 In Figure 1, we present the annual average effective taxation rates of individuals, HUFs
and  all  other  assessees  (which  consist  of  different  forms  of  body  incorporates  or
corporate entities—firm, companies, societies and trusts etc.). From 1954–55 to 1998–99,
the ETRs of individuals were lowest, the ETRs of corporate entities were highest while the
ETR of HUFs was between the two. Also, the ETR of all entities increased between 1973
and 1993. This had to do with the abolition of higher exemptions and lower tax rates to
HUFs as compared to individuals,5 along with the promulgation of the Monopolies and
Restrictive Trades Practices (MRTP) Act in 1971, which recognized the business group as a
whole  as  the  unit  of  organization  of  capital  and  put  in  restrictions  on  interlocking
shareholdings and directorships. Further, the ETRs of HUFs increased significantly in the
same period with the abolition of HUF privileges in land and other property holdings (but
not corporate holdings which come under the purview of the central government) in
Tamil  Nadu,  Kerala,  Andhra  Pradesh  and  Maharashtra.  The  decline  in  the  ETRs  of
corporates after  the mid-1980s is  explained by the dilution of  the MRTP Act  and its
subsequent repeal. The ETRs show a sharp decline in 1998–99 and 1999–2000 after which
the CBDT stopped releasing data. The recent data that has been released since 2012–13 to
2014–15 shows a decline in the ETR of individuals. But the steepest decline is recorded by
the ETR of HUFs in this period. Figures 1 and 2 together show that, in the period 2012–13
to 2014–15, HUFs have had the lowest ETR since 1956. This decline has been so steep that
among the three categories of individuals, HUFs and corporate entities, the HUF has been
paying the lowest effective tax in the same period, in which it is growing faster than
corporate entities (Table 2.2).
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Figure 1: Annual Average Effective Taxation Rates from 1955 to 2000; 2012–15
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data released by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Various
Years
Note: Data for the years 1970–71, 1973–74 are not available for all assessees. Also, data for
registered firms are available from 1956. There is no data available between 2000–01 and 2011–12.
 
Figure 2: Annual Effective Taxation Rate of HUFs
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data released by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Various
Years
 
Table 3.1: Composition of Income of Different Tax Categories: Average Shares (%) (2012–15)






Salary Income 0.0 52.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
House Property Income 9.3 2.4 1.6 1.9 1.6
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All  other  Income  (business  income,  short
and long term capital gains, interest etc.)
90.7 44.7 98.4 98.1 98.4
Loss Set-Off 1.08 0.97 5.04 19.5 8.22
ETR 8.28 9.69 39.06 24.92 22.23
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data released by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, 2016
 
Figure 3: Effective Income Taxation (%) Rates by Range of Income (Rs): 2012–2015
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data released by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, 2016
Note: 1.)10 lakh = 1 million; 10 million = 1 crore 2). There are only 3 HUFs in the income range of Rs
25–50 crore
51 An analysis of the sources of incomes of for various categories of tax assessees for the
period from 2012 to 2015 (the three years for which this data is available) is presented in
Table 3.1. More than 90 percent of HUF income accrues from business income, short and
long term capital gains and interest income. There is no salary income reported by HUFs.
In fact the composition of the HUF income is similar to the income composition of firms,
companies  and  other  body  incorporates  and  very  different  from the  composition  of
individual incomes in which salary income constitutes 52%. Thus the HUF is similar to a
corporate entity with the additional characteristic that around 9% of its income comes
from house property while this share is less than 2% for firms and companies. But, it gets
away with exemptions claiming to be a “family” utilizing income for maintenance treated
on par with an “individual” tax payer and pays the lowest rates of income tax (Table 3.1).
52 Figure 3 shows that the effective taxation rates of firms and companies decrease as size of
income increases, which is similar to the finding of the study based on the PROWESS
database cited earlier, demonstrating the regressive character of corporate taxation in
India. For individuals the trend of taxation is progressive but becomes regressive at the
top range for incomes above Rs 100 crores. The same trend is evident for the HUF but
with two significant features. First, at the bottom end, up to an income below Rs 10 lakhs,
the effective rate of taxation of HUFs is consistently less than individual tax assessees. It
is only for HUFs which earn an income higher than Rs 10 lakhs, that the effective taxation
rates are marginally higher than individual assessees. In the Rs 25 crore to 50 crore range,
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the ETR increases significantly but there are only 4 HUFs with an income above Rs 25
crore (Figure 3). Second, the effective tax paid by the HUF is much less than corporate
entities of business even though its income structure is similar to corporate entities as we
have shown earlier.  Thus the HUF is  an inter-locked corporate governance structure
whose activities based on income source is typically that of a business incorporate. It is
interlocked into the institutional structure of asset, wealth and property holding in India
in a maze of interlocked family and business entities spanning all  five tax categories
which  comprise  the  Hindu  family-owned  business  group.  There  is  no  systemic
compilation of data by the Indian state on interlocking tax entities and the extent of
direct and indirect ownership of economic assets and property by family-owned business
groups. The institutional structure of property rights (across all sectors of the economy)
in HUFs in India interweaves personal laws, corporate governance structures and tax laws
privileging the Hindu male as the asset/property/capital  owner.  Thus patriarchy and
religious  discrimination  are  endogenous  to  the  institutional  construction  of  the
structures  of  corporate  governance  and  taxation  that  govern  both  institutions  and
processes of capital accumulation in India. This institutional structure shows a sturdy
continuity  in  the  post-independence  period  despite  ideological  shifts  in  the
macroeconomic policy regime.
53 This  institutional  structure  is  embedded  in  state  codification  of  Hindu  family  law,
corporate governance laws and taxation laws. This unique legal family/firm interlock is
not available to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews and hence is a perverse legal privilege
for  the  Hindu  business  family.  The  HUF  has  been  and remains  the  primary  unit  of
organization  of  family  and  corporate  property,  income  and  wealth  reliant  on  the
institutions of majority religion, caste and patriarchy.
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NOTES
1. See Das Gupta (2016) for detailed case studies.
2. In  their  reports,  the  Vardachari  Commission  (1949)  and  the  Matthai  Commission  (1953)
justified  exemption  of  HUF  income  from  income  tax  and  suggested  twice  and  thrice  the
exemption limit to individuals. Both the committees were of the opinion that the sentiments
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involved in remaining undivided should be given consideration and that enough concessions
should  be  made for  those  who otherwise  want  to  remain undivided but,  for  the  purpose  of
lowering  taxation,  go  for  partition.  Their  recommendations  were  given  effect  through  the
subsequent Finance Acts.
3. The Mahavir Tyagi Committee (1958) did not mention the HUF as a tool for tax evasion while it
recognized trust  and cooperative  society  to  be  so.  The  Bhoothalingam committee  (1967)  did
mention the HUF as a tool for tax evasion, but regarded administrative burden as the reason not
to intervene in the provision. It was only the Wanchoo (1971) and K. N. Raj (1972) committees
that pointed to the HUF as a tax evading entity and suggested withdrawal of tax exemptions.
4. See Academic Foundation 2003.
5. The  statutory  tax  rate  for  the  HUF  has  been  the  same  as  that  of  individuals  since  the
intervention of the Wanchoo Committee and the K. N. Raj Committee, because of which the lower
tax rates for HUFs were raised to the level of the individual income-tax payer and the higher
exemption limit was done away with in the 1970s.
ABSTRACTS
Social  science  has  had  a  very  limited  engagement  with  the  socio-legal  entity  of  the  Hindu
Undivided Family (HUF). In corporate and personal law—the two spaces it inhabits—it has been
largely regarded as separate and distinct entity from “modern” tax and corporate governance
entities like individuals  and body incorporates.  It  is  often referred to as an archaic remnant
associated  with  feudal  structures  of  land  and  property  holdings.  Its  implications  on  capital
accumulation in the “modern” structures of corporate governance and tax structures have not
been studied at all. This paper is an attempt to arrive at a comprehensive delineation of the role
of the HUF in the corporate governance and taxation regime in independent India.
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